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Book Reviews
In the Spotlight

Dealing with the Russians
By Andrew Monaghan
Reviewed by Dr. Bettina Renz, professor of international security,
School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham

A

ndrew Monaghan’s book, Dealing with the Russians,
begins with an unambiguous warning: “so let us be
clear from the start: Russia poses a major challenge to the
Euro-Atlantic community. This challenge is serious and there
should be little doubt about it” (10). Moscow’s aggression against
Ukraine, ongoing since spring 2014, demonstrates Vladimir
Putin’s willingness to violate the most fundamental tenets of
international law. The string of hostile actions that followed set
Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press, 2019
Russia on a collision course with the United States and its allies.
160 pages
Russian military operations in Syria breached international
$59.95
humanitarian laws and risked the escalation of tensions.
Active measures, most prominently interference in the 2016 US presidential
elections, targeted democratic processes in western states. In response to these
aggressions, the Euro-Atlantic community adopted a series of measures for
dealing with the Russian threat, such as reinforcing NATO’s posture (especially
in Eastern Europe), imposing economic sanctions, and securing itself against
various hybrid threats.
In his cogently written and argued book, Monaghan diagnoses why the
Euro-Atlantic community’s efforts to date have failed to constrain Moscow’s
aggressive behavior. He argues although the community clearly agrees about
the severity of the challenges faced, the exact nature of the threat remains
inadequately understood. The United States and its allies lack a coherent strategy,
which is essential for dealing with Russia in the long term. To devise a successful
strategy, the United States and its allies will need a detailed understanding of
Moscow’s foreign policy.
In the chapter “(Mis)Interpreting the Russian Threat,” Monaghan discusses
how the uncritical use of historical analogies like the “New Cold War,” the
fixation on questionable abstractions like hybrid warfare or A2/AD, and especially
essentialist assumptions about Russian expansionism have become a “trap for
thinking” in the West (40). The resultant view of Russia lacks nuance and does
not accurately reflect the country’s foreign policy motivations, which are far more
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complex than the current focus on potential challenges to Euro-Atlantic security
suggests. The chapter “From Dialogue to Deterrence” demonstrates how a crude
understanding of contemporary Russia has hindered the identification of policies
suitable for handling the complex problem. Responses like economic sanctions or
NATO reinforcements in Eastern Europe are reactions to individual events rather
than elements of a coherent strategy.
Monaghan argues the perceived dichotomy in Western discourse of either
deterrence of, or dialogue with Russia, is particularly unhelpful. Can deterrence
work if it is based, at best, on a partial understanding of the Kremlin’s motivations
and capabilities? Can dialogue work without a nuanced understanding of the
nature of current tensions, including an appreciation of how the Kremlin’s
views of the United States and its allies have influenced its actions over the
past few decades? Neither deterrence nor dialogue are a panacea or an end in
itself. As Monaghan states, “success in both will be the consequence of a coherent
broader strategy” (85).
Dealing with the Russians provides food for thought for readers seeking a
better understanding of the current crisis in relations between the West and
Russia and possible ways forward to prevent tensions from spiraling. Above all,
the book is explicitly relevant for Western policymakers and decisionmakers
developing future policies vis-à-vis Moscow. Monaghan’s work, based on
extensive personal experience collaborating with policymakers and military
practitioners, is a plea to take the Russian challenge seriously. Doing so, however,
means more than hawkish political statements or the adoption of measures in
reaction to individual events.
In the concluding chapter, Monaghan outlines systematic efforts required,
in his view, to create a coherent future strategy. There is no quick-fix solution.
Instead, a serious investment in reinvigorating the Russian studies community
is required to regain the linguistic skills and country expertise lost since
the end of the Cold War. This focus should not be too narrow. A holistic
understanding of contemporary Russian foreign policy needs to draw on
interdisciplinary insights from history, politics, sociology, and economics.
Institutional partnerships able to coordinate knowledge exchanges between
researchers—academics, think tanks, and independents—and relevant state
structures also need to be strengthened. Most importantly, concerted effort
is required to confront and challenge groupthink in policy- and decisionmaking circles, such as the ongoing fixation on hybrid warfare, which has been
comprehensively debunked by Russian military experts.
The United States and its allies have failed to devise a coherent Russia
strategy not only because of persisting “narrow, abstract and clichéd” views
of Russia, but also because these views have been “impervious to ‘reasonable
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challenge’ ” (92). Policymakers and decisionmakers in the West willing to have
their views challenged in the name of devising a future grand strategy for
Russia should read Monaghan’s book.
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Strategy

The Art of War in an Age of Peace:
U.S. Grand Strategy and Resolute Restraint
By Michael O’Hanlon
Reviewed by Dr. Frank Hoffman, US Marine Corps (retired), research fellow,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

H

ow should the United States adapt to today’s challenging
strategic context? It faces a rising China, a reckless
Vladimir Putin in Moscow, diminished credibility among allies
large and small, and a host of underfunded domestic needs—
especially infrastructure and technology—that will impact future
prosperity and security for generations. In this dangerous world,
how can the Biden-Harris administration coherently balance its
aspirational policy aims while constrained by a federal budget
that bleeds red ink?

New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2021
304 pages
$28.00

In The Art of War in an Age of Peace: U.S. Grand Strategy
and Resolute Restraint, Michael O’Hanlon, director of research
at the Brookings Institution, offers a trenchant analysis of the challenges and a
strategic outline that avoids the pitfalls of retrenchment and the dangers of
imperial overstretch. His grand strategy, “resolute restraint,” carefully positions
the United States for the long run, without wild alterations that may undermine
global stability or endanger vital US interests (xii).
O’Hanlon carefully distinguishes resolute restraint from “offshore balancing”
and the “restraint” strategy promoted by Barry Posen, which focuses on
US overspending and a reposturing of the US military (37). O’Hanlon’s resolute
restraint seeks more discipline in American interventions but argues, appropriately,
for continuing US alliance commitments. He sees our friends and partners as a
unique strategic advantage that should be sustained, not undercut—a perspective
echoed in Mira Rapp-Hooper’s superlative Shields of the Republic (2020).
O’Hanlon’s version is resolute about the defense of those allies, the rules-based
order, and freedom of maneuver in the global commons. He is restrained about the
use of force in every minor crisis, resistant to growing additional allies or partners,
and opposed to the heavy promotion of values, human rights, and democracy.
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Our current and future allies and partners will not find O’Hanlon’s ideas on
restraint reassuring and, perhaps influenced by the growing narrative about the
erosion of US power and credibility, may hedge against it. The recent fiasco in
Afghanistan will be seen as an example of excessive restraint and, on Washington’s
part, a shortfall in resolute leadership. While deep engagement may be
unaffordable, persistent leadership and true partnership with current and future
allies will be necessary if order is to be sustained.
The chapter on China is extensive, well-balanced, and noteworthy in its
analysis and prescriptions. O’Hanlon acknowledges the Communist Party’s foreign
activities over the past decade “suggest hegemonic temptations of a much more
sweeping character” and a level of ambition that is “a dagger right at the heart of
the rules-based global order” (85). He calls for a smart strategy that recognizes
the inevitability of China’s growing influence and seeks to redirect Beijing’s
progress in nonthreatening directions. O’Hanlon details the relative structural
advantages the United States enjoys in terms of economic potential and offers
several well-founded recommendations to enhance American competitiveness.
O’Hanlon’s unique threat framework is a distinctive element of the book.
While the first section follows the Pentagon’s most recent threat construct, which
covers China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and transnational terrorism (sometimes
referred to as “4+1”), O’Hanlon generates a more functional framework he
calls “the other 4+1” (173). This construct lists the threats from nuclear, biological,
digital, climatic, and domestic support and focuses on the need to buttress domestic
support for a renewed grand strategy, as well as manage our burgeoning debt. We
tend to overlook these challenges, which is a mistake. As O’Hanlon notes:
None of the above are scheming enemies in the traditional sense.
But they pose serious challenges nonetheless. When they interact
with the classic list of threats, they can make every
problem more serious. They can exacerbate, intensify,
or accelerate the dangers post by more classic, human
adversaries; they raise the stakes enormously (161).
This chapter presents a compelling argument for ensuring these issues are
captured within the national security strategy. O’Hanlon offers examples of
actions America can take to remedy our limited preparedness and mitigate these
threats. The one shortfall about the alternative “other 4+1” is it overlooks domestic
terrorism (173). While controversial, the inclusion of the left and far-right
elements of domestic terrorism more accurately reflects contemporary security
challenges in the aftermath of the 2020 election and the pandemic.
After the book’s tour d’horizon of threat actors and functional challenges,
readers will find it difficult to call today an age of peace. Moreover, while
O’Hanlon does offer prescriptions useful as grand strategy, they hardly constitute
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an “art of war.” While this is a quibble, “The Double Threat Matrix” would have
been a more appropriate title, given the double set of threats presented.
O’Hanlon also properly derides Steven Pinker’s thesis about the end of war, calling
the idea of an inexorable path toward global peace “Pollyannaish” (161).
All in all, O’Hanlon’s The Art of War is a sound overview of today’s
accelerating and converging challenges, offering a reasonable strategic approach
that conserves and focuses America’s power on its core interests. This realistic
book merits serious consideration for professional military education reading
lists and is strongly recommended for classroom use in strategic studies programs
due to its balanced and prudent approach.
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Military History

The Folly of Generals: How Eisenhower’s Broad
Front Strategy Lengthened World War II
By David P. Colley
Reviewed by Dr. Gregory L. Cantwell, colonel, US Army (retired)

D

avid P. Colley’s 2021 book, The Folly of Generals:
How Eisenhower’s Broad Front Strategy Lengthened
World War II, examines Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) military actions and missed
opportunities during the war. An award-winning author,
journalist, and former US Army ordnance branch officer,
Colley believes the SHAEF could have achieved victory seven
or eight months ahead of May 1945. He contends the “ ‘broad
front’ strategy” planned and executed in Europe denied the
Allies the ability to concentrate forces in a decisive point and
exploit success over the course of World War II (xi).

Havertown, PA:
Casemate, 2021
264 pages
$34.95

Much of the historical review on World War II describes the Allied forces as
heroic figures who defeated the forces of evil in Germany. With the discovery of
the concentration camps and systemic genocide of millions of people in Germany
and Poland, it is hard to argue World War II was a war the Allies had to win.
The Folly of Generals does not erase that image, but does shine a light on the
tactical opportunities that could have been exploited if senior Allied commanders
were more aggressive and willing to take additional risk.
Colley cites interviews with several German generals after the war who
admitted to weaknesses in the German Siegfried Line of defenses the Allies
could have exploited. He specifically examines operations at Arnhem in the
Netherlands, Falaise in France, and Valmontone in Italy, as well as Operation
Husky and campaigns to cross the Rhine and liberate Paris. According
to Colley, these operations are examples of tactical opportunities that—
had the Allies been willing to abandon their rigid commitment to a broad front
strategy moving from west to east into Germany—could have led them to
greater success against the Germans. Much of his criticism is placed upon both
the SHAEF and General Dwight D. Eisenhower the SHAEF commander.
Colley refers to the refusal to change strategies “as the US Army’s
(or Eisenhower’s) tactical ignorance” which prevented them from
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reinforcing success or “concentrate[ing] forces on a single objective”
(x). He also notes political considerations, rather than tactical strategy,
played a part in the decision making at SHAEF which rippled down through
the organization.
Much has been written about the impact Winston Churchill,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin had on the strategic conduct of the
war. The Folly of Generals instead focuses on tactical opportunities. For example,
Army group commander Jacob Devers and his forces reached Strasbourg, France,
in November 1944 and had the opportunity to cross the Rhine. He intended
to drive north on the east side of the river to relieve pressure from other Allied
forces in the north. Eisenhower, however, wanted a breakthrough to occur
in the north after he consolidated all forces on the west side of the Rhine and
refused to let Devers cross the river. Colley argues Eisenhower was too cautious.
He cites an intelligence debrief report from the German chief of staff to
SS General Vatterodt, the commander in Strasbourg, which confirmed a
penetration across the Rhine at Strasbourg would have seriously upset the
German forces lightly guarding this sector. Colley contends if Eisenhower had
authorized Devers to cross the Rhine in November 1944, then the Battle of
the Bulge would not have occurred in December.
While Colley’s claim that Eisenhower was too cautious may have some
merit, the SHAEF commander had many challenges to balance beyond tactical
advances and opportunities. Coalition maintenance, wartime production limits,
mobilization and training timelines, sustainment challenges, displaced personnel,
humanitarian support, and political considerations may override the tactical
opportunities division and Army commanders encounter. Eisenhower had to win
the war with the army he had. The broad front strategy might have been designed
to win by attrition rather than by annihilation. Opportunities for tactical victories
and exploitation did exist, but they appear to have conflicted with the Allied
strategy based on attrition on two fronts. Tactics must be nested into higher level
strategy or they are considered a waste of resources.
The Folly of Generals raises, but does not answer, many of the timeless
challenges for a commander in large-scale combat operations at echelons
well above the brigade combat team level. When is a strategy of annihilation
better than one of attrition? Can a theater strategy change between the two?
Command decisions require a commander to make decisions with imperfect
information. Personalities and relationships between commanders may be more
important than command relationships at the senior levels, and sustainment still
determines the feasibility of strategic options. If we are contested in all domains
in the projected future, an expeditionary army can expect sustainment challenges
with long lines of communications.
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Colley’s book provides historical examples, and he supports his argument at
the tactical level. It is difficult, however, to prove a conclusion to the war would
have been achieved sooner at the strategic level based on a tactical victory. The
actions of a committed adversary fighting an existential threat should not be
underestimated. Bold tactical actions could have ended the war; they also
could have deteriorated Allied cooperation and, in one extreme, made postwar
conditions in Europe worse at the start of the Cold War. Historians can talk past
each other when considering the strategic, operational, or tactical level operations
and decisions, and both can be correct. In any war, mistakes that could have saved
lives become clear only in hindsight. As war is a human endeavor, perhaps we
should not judge too harshly the sacrifices of the few who bore the burden of
supreme command and succeeded in winning the war.
I recommend The Folly of Generals for readers interested in the European
campaign who will enjoy the division-level tactical opportunities explored in the
book. It clearly highlights the major challenges of coalition warfare in large-scale
combat operations and demonstrates the differences of perspectives between
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and associated priorities and risk
at each level.

